

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 155406

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT NICOSIA 1446 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ANKARA,  
ATHENS, LONDON, NATO, USUN JULY 17,

QUOTE

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1446

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS USCINCEUR

DIA WASHDC //DI-5//

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY  
SUBJECT: COUP: SHORT-TERM US POLICY AND MID-TERM CONSIDERATIONS

REF: NICOSIA 1371

SUMMARY: BEST HOPE WE SEE OF AVOIDING WAR IS NOT TO TRY TO  
PERSUADE GREEK JUNTA TO UNDO WHAT IT HAS DONE, BUT RATHER TO  
ENCOURAGE TURKEY TO COME TO BELIEVE THAT ITS INTERESTS ARE  
BETTER SERVED BY DEALING WITH A WEAK AND COMPLIANT SAMPSON  
REGIME THAN BY GOING TO WAR TO RESTORE A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

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WHICH INCLUDES RESTORATION OF THEIR ARCH-ENEMY MAKARIOS. ON

RECOGNITION, SUGGEST WE MADE CLEAR THAT WE CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE MAKARIOS GOVERNMENT, BUT NOT FORECLOSE PROSPECT OF MOVING TO RECOGNITION OF NEW REGIME (ON STRICTLY NON-MORALISTIC GROUNDS) IF, AS SEEMS FAIRLY LIKELY, IT SUCCEEDS IN CONSOLIDATING ITS POWER FOR A PERIOD ON CYPRUS. END SUMMARY

1. LET US UNDERScore ANKARA'S REMARK THAT THE KEY PRESENT ISSUE IS TO KEEP GREECE AND TURKEY FROM WAR. LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVE IS TO AVOID INTRA-GREEK CIVIL WAR ON ISLAND WITH LIKELIHOOD THAT USSR WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN SUPPORT OF LEFT.

2. ON RECOGNITION, WE BELIEVE USG SHOULD SAY QUITE FRANKLY THAT WE CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT MAKARIOS\* WITHOUT GETTING TRAPPED INTO PREDICTIONS AS TO WHAT WE WILL DO IN THE FUTURE. WE OWE ATHENS NOTHING FOR THIS LITTLE FRACAS, AND WE ASSUME TURKEY WOULD BE EMBITTERED AND LESS AMENABLE TO OUR SUGGESTIONS IF WE SEEM TO ABANDON ANKARA BY ANY PRESENT WEAKNESS ON RECOGNITION. IN FORTHCOMING UN DEBATES, EMBASSY WOULD PREFER TO SEE USG ON SIDE OF JUSTICE AND INCIDENTALLY OF VAST MAJORITY.

3. ON INFORMAL LEVEL, WE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING PERSUADE NEW REGIME OF EXTREME DANGER OF ITS POSITION AND TO ENCOURAGE IT TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SHOW THEMSELVES AS NO THREA TO TURKS (SEPTELS). WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE THOSE EFFORTS. NEW "FOREIGN MINISTER" IS A VERY CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF EMBASSY AND HAS BEEN ANXIOUS TO TALK PRIVATELY ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS WITHOUT SEEKING ANY RECOGNITION. (HE TRIED TO CALL UK HICOM INTO FOREIGN MINISTRY, BUT HAS NOT TRIED THIS PLOY WITH US.)

4. PRINCIPAL HOPE OF KEEPING ANKARA FROM TAKING UP ARMS (SEE NICOSIA 1442) SEEMS TO BE COMBINATION OF PERSUASION FROM TURKISH ALLIES AND FROM NATO, COUPLED WITH SOME EVIDENCE FROM CYPRUS THAT THIS NEW OUTFIT MAY BE EASIER TO DEAL WITH THAN MAKARIOS. WE SUSPECT THAT ANY HOPE OF RESOLVING CONFLICT BY PERSUADING ATHENS TO BACK DOWN (E.G., TO WITHDRAW ITS 600 OFFICERS, AS NATO REQUESTED) IS NOT IN THE CARDS. MOREOVER, WE THINK THAT WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK OFFICERS AT THIS STAGE WOULD LEAVE A HEAVILY-ARMED AND DISORGANIZED RABBLE IN CONTROL OF

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ISLAND, WITH CATASTROPHIC RESULTS. AS TO LINE OF COMMAND, WE WOULD PREFER EVEN IOANNIDES' FINGER ON THE TRIGGER RATHER THAN SAMPSON'S

5. WE AGREE WITH SYG LUNS (USNATO 3911) THAT ATENS HAS GOTTEN ITSELF INTO A SITUATION WHERE IT IS POLITICALLY DOOMED IF ITS CYPRUS VENTURE IS A FLOP BUT WOULD BE MILITARILY DEFEATED BY TURKEY IF ITS CYPRUS VENTURE SUCCEEDED. GREEK JUNTA HAS ALREADY

DEMONSTRATED CONVINCINGLY THAT IT IS WILLING TO PUT PRIDE ABOVE THE RATIONAL PURSUIT OF ITS OWN INTERESTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, TURKEY IS BEHAVING, SO FAR AT LEAST, WITH CIRCUMSPECTION. AS THE SITUATION UNFOLDS, ANKARA MAY BEGIN TO FEEL ITS INTERESTS ARE AS WELL SERVED BY APLIANT AND WEAK SAMPSON GOVERNMENT (OR POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT) AS BY SETTING IN MOTION AN INVASION WHICH COULD RESTORE THE HATED MAKARIOS TO POWER, PARTICULARLY WHEN TURKEY CONSIDERS THE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH AN EFFORT, INCLUDING THE LIKELIHOOD THAT, AFTER THE ISLAND HAS BEEN FRACTIONED BY THIS COUP, MAKARIOS WILL BE MORE THAN EVER DEPENDENT UPON THE LEFT IF HE DOES RETURN TO POWER. FURTHERMORE, ANKARA MAY CONCLUDE THAT RELATIVE STABILITY HERE IS BETTER THAN A LEFT/RIGHT INTRA-GREEK CIVIL WAR WITH THE ATTENDANT PROSPECT OF DEEPER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT.

6. WE ASSUME THAT MAKARIOS WILL HAVE OVERWHELMING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, AT LEAST ORALLY. IF MALTESE PM MINTOFF'S PERSONAL REACTION, EXPRESSED TO OUR AMBASSADOR, IS ANY INDICATOR, THIS SUPPORT MAY BE MORE VEBAL THAN REAL, EXCEPT FOR SOVIET BLOC.

7. AS TO SUPPORT ON THE ISLAND ITSELF, WE THINK A DISPASSIONATE LOOK IS IN ORDER. THE GENERAL POLITICAL FLACCIDITY WHICH HAMPERED GRIVAS' EFFORTS TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT AGAINST MAKARIOS 18 MONTHS AGO NOW SEEMS TO HAVE WORKED TO MAKARIOS' DIS-ADVANTAGE IN THE CURRENT COUP. FROM WHAT WE CAN SEE, AND FROM WHAT UNSYG REP WECKMANN TELLS US, IT APPEARS THAT ONLY IN PAPHOS DID PRO-MAKARIOS NATIONAL GUARDSMEN TAKE CONTROL. ELSEWHERE, DESPITE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THERE WAS SCATTERED RESISTENCE AMONG NATIONAL GUARD ENLISTEES, THE CYPRIOT SOLDIERS EITHER FOLLOWED THEIR GREEK OFFICERS OR WERE NEUTRALIZED. (FALSE REPORT OF MAKARIOS' DEATH MAY HAVE

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CONTRIBUTED TO THIS.) MOREOVER, WE HAVE REPORTED THAT SOME RIGHT-WING ORGANIZATIONS HAVE GOTTEN ON THE BANDWAGON WITH EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR SAMPSON. CLERIDES' POSITION IS A MOST IMPORTANT ONE, AND HE SEEMS TO HAVE AGREED TO CONTINUE TO SERVE AS INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATOR (THOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT IF ANY CONDITIONS HE ATTACHED).

8. THE UPSHOT OF THIS VERY PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF LOCAL ATTITUDES IS TO SUGGEST THAT THE FEARED POLARIZATION DID OCCUR, AND THAT MUCH OF THE CENTER AND RIGHT LOOKED UPON THE COUP WITH MIXED FEELINGS. (WE HAD EARLIER REPORTED GROWING CONCERNS THAT MAKARIOS WAS MOVING AGAINST THE MOTHERLAND AND THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONVERT THE POLICE, THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE NATIONAL GUARD INTO SOMETHING OF A PERSONAL INSTRUMENT.) WE ASSUME THAT THE NEW REGIME WILL

MOVE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS, AND THAT THEY WILL FIGHT BACK WITH EVERY RESOURCE THEY HAVE. THE PROSPECT FOR DOMESTIC INSTABILITY IS HIGH, AND THE LONG-TERM PROSPECT OF A DIVIDED COMMUNITY RULED BY GREECE VIA SAMPSON IS A GLOOMY ONE. HOWEVER, THE REGIME MAY VERY WELL ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE ISLAND FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD.

9. IF IN SOME WEEKS' TIME, THE REGIME DOES SEEM IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL, AND IF THE MENACE OF TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION HAS RECEDED IN THE FACE OF THE CALCULATIONS SUGGESTED ABOVE, WE THINK THE USG SHOULD NOT HAVE CLOSED ITS OPTION TO MOVE TOWARD RECOGNITION IN CIRCUMSTANCES CONDUCTIVE TO EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS. OVER THE LONG TERM, THE USG HAS HAD ENOUGH PROBLEMS APPLYING MORAL STANDARDS TO RECOGNITION. WE HAVE IN THE SENATE RESOLUTION OF 1969 AND OUR RECENT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS A NATURAL RATIONALE FOR EXPLAINING A DECISION TO RECOGNIZE ON A BASIS OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL. AT THAT TIME, WE WOULD ASSUME THAT, STILL OWING VERY LITTLE TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT OR TO ATHENS, WE COULD VERY WELL ACCOMPANY OUR RECOGNITION WITH AN EXPRESSION OF REGRET THAT FORCE WAS USED TO SUPPLANT AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE CONTINUE TO REGARD THE ARCHBISHOP WITH RESPECT.

10. IN ANY CASE, THIS FENCE IS TO BE CROSSED LATER, NOT NOW.

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